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Managing Security Risks Using Attack-Defense Trees 
Abstract: 
Nowadays there is an increasing demand for answering the security needs in systematic 
ways. The In this thesis, we have addressed risk management using Attack Tree. 
Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) is a model which covers all the 
important concepts in risk management. Also, attack trees are simple and efficient tools for 
showing the risks. There are few extensions of attack trees, but none of them covers all risk 
concepts. The said problem limited the usage of attack tree model since it does not consider 
important measures such as countermeasures, or threat agent’s profile. 
The contribution to resolve the problem in this thesis includes three steps.  
Obtaining an alignment from Attack-Defense trees to ISSRM.  
Measurement of the metrics of the nodes of tree using historical data 
Implementation of a tool based on obtained tree. 
Using the alignment, we have detected the uncovered concepts in Attack-Defense tree. Then 
we tried to add these concepts to the current Attack-Defense tree. Therefore, the new Attack-
Defense tree (called Aligned Attack-Defense tree or A-ADTree) covers most important con-
cepts of ISSRM. In order to measure the risk, we have proposed a mathematical model to 
evaluate the probability of the nodes in the tree, based on historical data. Then, implemented 
tool helps to materialize the effect of threat agent’s profile, and countermeasures on the 
risks. The result of implemented tool shows, the obtained A-ADTree has more capabilities 
(in the evaluation of the probability of risk) in comparison to previous versions.  
This solution is capable of giving more hints for the project managers when they are decid-
ing about possible solutions in industries. Additionally, this alignment helps to obtain 
another alignment between A-ADTree and the other modeling languages in future, since 
these modeling languages are already aligned to ISSRM. 
Keywords: 
ISSRM, Attack Tree, Alignment, Risk, Risk treatment 
CERCS:T120 
Pealkiri eesti keeles 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Nagu mujal valdkondades, kasvab tänapäeval vajadus turvalisuse järele nii ka ärimaailmas. 
Käesolev magistritöö üritab seda probleemi lahendada kasutades riskianalüüsi diagrammi 
mudelit, mida inglise keeles nimetatakse Attack Tree. 
ISSRM (Information System Security Risk Managment) on mudel, mis käsitleb kõiki olulisi 
riskianalüüsi aspekte, on lihtsalt arusaadav ja annab olukorrast kiire ülevaate. Laiendustena 
on olemas mõned sellised riskianalüüsi diagrammid, kuid ükski neist pole võimeline 
käsitlema kõiki võimalikke ohuolukordi. See paneb diagrammi kasutamisele piirid, kuna ei 
arvesta võimalikke vastumeetmeid ohtudele, ega ohuallika profiili. 
Antud magistritöö pakub sellele probleemile kolmeosalist lahendust. 
1. luua sild riskianalüüsi puu osast, mis käsitleb kaitsetehnikaid (Attack Defence Tree), 
kuni ISSRM mudelini; 
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2. arvestades minevikus ette tulnud riske, riskifaktorite tõenäolisuse ja nendega seotud 
kulutuste mõõteparameetrite väljatöötamine; 
3. tööriista kasutamine, mis on välja töötatud antud riskianalsüüsipuu abil. 
Selliselt loodud sild aitab leida veel avastamata aspekte riskianalüüsi puus. Lisades sellise 
laienduse, on riskianalüüsi puu täielikum ja muudab ISSRM mudeli mitmekülgsemaks. 
Selleks et riske paremini analüüsida, on kasulik arvestada ka minevikus ette tulnud ohte 
ning neid matemaatiliselt uurida tõenäolisuse aspektist, et minimeerida sarnaste ohuolukor-
dade taastekkimise tõenäosust. Magistritöö tegemise käigus välja töötatud tööriist (Aligned 
Attack-Defense Tree or A-ADTree) on võimekam riski tõenäosusele hinnangu andmisel 
teistest juba olemasolevatest versioonidest. 
Antud tööriist annab riskianalüüsi hindajatele rohkem võimalusi võimalike ohuolukordade 
lahendamiseks ja ennetamiseks. Kuna siin kasutatud modelleerimiskeeled on juba sobi-
tatud ISSRM mudeliga, võimaldab antud töös välja töötatud laiendus luua enam seoseid 
selle ning teiste modelleerimiskeelte (nt Secure BPMN, Misuse-case diagram, Secure 
TROPOS, and Mal-Activity diagram) vahel ka tulevikus. 
Võtmesõnad: 
joondamine, riskide vähendamine, risk 
CERCS:T120 
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays, software is improving performance in the industries. Therefore, the industries 
and organizations use information systems to support their business. Unfortunately, at the 
same time, malicious attacks are organized against the information system.  Thus, it is cru-
cial to understand the possible risks deeply in the design level of these information systems. 
It means that the modeling languages should be capable of presenting the risks at the design 
level.   
One of the methods which facilitates recognizing the possible risks is Information System 
Security Risk Management (ISSRM)[1,2,44]. It also introduces an approach for considering 
some risk treatment for the identified risk. Additionally, using ISSRM, we are able to eval-
uate possible risks and risk treatments based on cost. Therefore, it supports decision making 
in the highest level of management. 
ISSRM supports some risk concepts, but since it is not a modeling language, there should 
be an alignment from ISSRM to the modeling languages. The models like Secure BPMN 
[4,5,7], Misuse-case diagram [13], Secure TROPOS [9,10], and Mal-Activity diagram [18] 
have very good features to present risk concepts based on ISSRM. 
Attack tree [15] is another modeling language, which presents different possible attacks to 
an information system. This model may provide some information about the cost of risk, 
and the probability of it. Although the attack trees are a common tool to present a different 
kind of risks on a system, they are incapable of representing some important aspects of 
information systems. In fact, the attack trees simply mention the different approaches to 
achieve a malicious goal without pointing to the assets, vulnerabilities, and security require-
ments. However, the attack trees are useful, they do not provide enough information for the 
software engineers to avoid the probable risks. There are different extensions of attack trees 
such as vulnerability tree, or protection tree. One of the extensions is Attack-Defense tree 
[25,26], which may show both risk concepts and risk treatment in a tree structure. We con-
sider the ISSRM as a complete reference which shows all the essential concepts of infor-
mation systems. Therefore, there is a need to make an alignment of the Attack-Defense tree 
to ISSRM. 
However, the Attack-Defense tree has the potentiality of presenting the risk, and risk treat-
ment concepts, it cannot show the vulnerability or the asset in an information system. Ad-
ditionally, it is important to evaluate the cost and probability of nodes in the tree properly.  
One of the methods to measure the probability is OCTAVE [37]. This method tries to eval-
uate the probability of attack nodes mostly subjectively and based on the opinion of experts. 
Although this feature simplifies the estimation of probability, it is very subjective and could 
lead to different results in similar cases. Also, the evaluation of OCTAVE is qualtivative.We 
have tried to propose a statistical method based on OCTAVE which evaluates the probabil-
ity of the risk based on historical data. 
Main Q. How can we align attack tree to Information System Security Risk Management? 
The main question is decomposed to three questions? 
Q1. How can we show the main elements of risks in information systems? 
     Q1.1.What is the ISSRM?     
     Q1.2. What are the existing alignments of modeling languages to ISSRM model? 
     Q1.3.What is attack tree? 
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     Q1.4. What is the meaning of multiset semantic? 
     Q1.5. What are the concert and abstract syntax of an attack tree?  
     Q1.6. What are the main measurement approaches in attack trees? 
Q2.How can we align Attack-Defense tree to ISSRM? 
      Q2.1.What Attack-Defense tree constructs could be aligned to the ISSRM domain 
model? 
      Q2.2 What is the evaluation of metrics in both attack, and defense nodes? 
      Q2.3 What is the new measurement model in aligned Attack-Defense tree? 
 Q3. How can we validate the aligned Attack-Defense tree? 
       Q3.1 What is design for implementation of aligned Attack-Defense tree? 
       Q3.2 What are the examples of risk mitigation using aligned Attack-Defense tree? 
In this thesis, we have tried to make an alignment from Attack-Defense tree to ISSRM. The 
alignment helped us, to detect the missed concepts of ISSRM in Attack-Defense tree. Then, 
we have added the missed concepts to the Attack-Defense tree, and we have obtained a new 
Attack-Defense tree (A-ADTree), which shows important the concepts of ISSRM. In the 
next step, we have implemented a tool based on the derived Attack-Defense tree. In order 
to obtain the probability of risk, we have proposed a mathematical model which works based 
on historical data, OCTAVE, and Bayes theorem. At the end, we have implemented a tool 
to show how the A-ADTree works. 
The second chapter includes a literature review over ISSRM and the other modeling lan-
guages alignment to ISSRM. Chapter three is about attack tree families, and the measure-
ment approaches. In chapter four, we explain the alignment of Attack-Defense tree to 
ISSRM. In chapter five, we explain the structure of historical data and evaluation of proba-
bility. The sixth chapter explains the risk measurement in the aligned Attack-Defense tree. 
Chapter seventh, explains the design, and requirement of implemented aligned attack-de-
fense tree. And the last chapter provides two examples to show how A-ADTree (aligned 
Attack-Defense tree) works. 
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Part I: State of the Art 
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2. Security Risk Management 
Information System Security Risk Management [1,2,44] is a conceptual model which shows 
the main concepts which are involved in each risk. It contains both risk, risk treatment, and 
the assets in an information system. We consider ISSRM as a reference for risk management 
concepts. 
Also, language models facilitate the design of the whole system. It is important to show the 
risks at the design level. Using alignment, we detect the concepts of ISSRM to in a system. 
There are some well-known models such as BPMN [4,5,7], Misuse case diagram [13], Mal-
activity diagram [18], and secure TROPOS [8,9], which are aligned to the ISSRM. 
In this chapter, we answer  
Q1.1.What is the ISSRM? 
Q1.2. What are the existing alignments of modeling languages to ISSRM model? 
2.1 ISSRM 
Information system security risk management is a domain model which presents the main 
items in an information system from the perspective of security [1]. These items include (1) 
Assets concepts, (2) Risk concepts, and (3) Risk treatments concepts. Fig 1. shows the 
domain model of ISSRM. 
 
Fig 1. The ISSRM Domain model- adapted from [1][2] 
Assets concepts: In ISSRM, the assets mentions to all valuable things in the organization. 
It has two main categories, Business assets and Information System assets (IS Asset). Busi-
ness Assets are the assets which are related to the processes, business, information, or es-
sential skills of the organization. IS Asset consist of all the valuable things related to the 
information system part. Therefore, the equipment like database, networks, routers and op-
erating systems are among IS assets. All assets can be a target of malicious actions. Thus, it 
is essential to consider the security criterion for them. There is three main criterion in this 
part, integrity, availability, and confidentiality. 
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Risk concepts: In the ISSRM a risk is a combination of several different concepts. The most 
important ones are threat agent, attack method, vulnerability, and impact. The rest of con-
cepts (like Event, Threat, and Risk) are derived from the aggregation of these four concepts. 
A threat agent is anyone that has skills and motivation to do a malicious attack. An Attack 
method is a process which may lead to a problem in the whole system. A threat is potential 
possibility that, an attacker uses an attack method against an asset. Also, a threat exploits 
some vulnerabilities in the information system assets. These vulnerabilities are characteris-
tics in the IS assets which facilitate the threats. 
In case a threat agent uses some attack methods to exploit the vulnerability against one or 
more IS assets, then we face with an event which leads to some negative impacts on the 
system. These impacts are a negation of security criterion. They harm both IS or business 
assets. Finally, a risk is an aggregation of negative events and their impacts. 
Threat Agent: Threat agent is one of the key concepts in the ISSRM. A threat agent can be 
described as motive, opportunity, capabilities, and means [36]. Motive discusses the 
source of motivation of the threat agent. Means point to the equipment which attacker may 
need to perform the attack. Opportunity mentions to the time of attacker to perform his 
attack and make several mistakes. Capability states the knowledge and skills of the attacker.  
Risk Treatment Concepts: Risk-treatment concepts involves three main factors. The first 
factor is risk treatment which describes the policy to face the risk. This policy could be one 
of the risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer, or risk retention. The risk treatment part 
is a management decision part. The second factor is security requirement, and the third one 
is controlling. Security requirement gets extracted based on the risk and risk treatment pol-
icy. The control is an implementation of security requirements.  The cost attribute helps to 
evaluate the solutions from the perspective of the economy.    
Metrics:  The ISSRM security metric is introduced in [3]. It tries to evaluate the effective-
ness of security controls based on risk level before and after applying the risk treatment 
solutions. The risk level simply describes, the possibility of risk based on the potentiality of 
the event and its impact. Also, potentiality depends on the likelihood of threat and vulnera-
bility level of an IS asset. The threat likelihood and vulnerability level are the qualitative 
measures which are mapped to a set of numerical value. 
2.2 Overview of Modelling Languages 
BPMN: Business Process Management (BPM) is the science to manage processes in an 
organization. One of the purposes of BPM is to find defects in the process and mitigate 
them. Such improvements benefit both customers and organization. The Business Process 
Management and Notation (BPMN) is a process modeling language which presents how a 
process works in an organization in detail [4][5]. In [7] the authors introduced an extension 
of BPMN with respect to the ISSRM. This extension supports the presentation of three main 
components of ISSRM using an alignment. Using this modeling language, it would be easy 
to consider security requirements, security risk, and endangered assets during the early steps 
of system design. 
TROPOS: In [8], Bresciani introduced an agent-oriented model to develop software. This 
model has few steps. Firstly, the problem and the organization get defined. Secondly, the 
functional requirements get documented. Then, the relation between the main components 
(architecture), and their interaction should define. Finally, the implementation of the system 
happens. Secure TROPOS is an extension of this model [9][10][11].Its main point is to in-
tegrate security during the development process based on TROPOS method. It is important 
to find a way to consider security during the design and early steps of development. 
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Although TROPOS shows the security requirements with soft-goal, it presents soft-goal in 
the third step (architecture). Therefore, the security is not considered in the first two steps 
of design (early and late requirements). Additionally, it is unable to present some security 
constraint in the system. The objective of secure TROPOS is to cover these problems. 
Misuse Case: Misuses case [13] is an extension of the usecase diagram to present risk re-
lated issues in an organization. The usecase diagram can present functional requirements 
well, but it is not able to present non-functional requirements like security. Misuse case tries 
to answer to such needs in the usecase diagram. It simplifies understanding of security is-
sues. Then it would be easy to define a set of requirements based on a defined security issue. 
However, Misuse case is easy to use and learn, its output is hard to analyze [6]. 
Mal-Activity: Mal-Activity diagram is another modeling language to present possible neg-
ative activities in an information system [18]. An activity diagram is used to show a scenario 
or a usecase in an organization [19][20]. To draw a mal-activity, first, we draw an activity 
diagram to depict normal procedure, then add the mal-activity. Like Misuse-case diagram, 
the main purpose of this diagram is also, presenting the illegitimate and legitimate activities 
at the same time. Although the Mal-activity and Misuse case diagrams follow the same ap-
proach, they are complementary in some aspects [6].  Table 1. shows the concrete syntaxes 
in each languages which are used to show ISSRM concepts. 
Table 1. Alignment of different languages to asset concepts- adapted from [2] 
ISSRM BPMN Secure TROPOS Misuse Case Mal-activity  
Assets 
Event, Task, 
Gateway, 
Sequence flow 
Actor,  
Hardgoal, 
Plan, 
Resource,  
different  depend-
encies, 
means-end,  
decomposition 
links, 
 contribution 
Actor, 
Usecase, 
extend, and 
include links  
Decision, 
Activity, 
Control flow Business Asset Data Object 
IS Asset Data Store, Pool package Swimlane 
Security crite-
rion 
Lock 
(Confidentiality,    
Integrity, 
 Availability) 
Security con-
straint, 
Softgoal, 
Decomposition 
links 
Security  crite-
rion -- 
 
2.3 Language alignments to ISSRM domain model 
In [12] the author explains the alignments of the modeling languages to the ISSRM. The 
alignment shows presentation of the three main components of ISSRM with the constructs 
of each language. Alignment shows which constructs have the potentiality to match with 
which class in the ISSRM domain model. In [14] the author summarized the alignments as 
it is presented in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7. The alignment of some languages is not so 
precise. To deal with such problem, it is useful to define and add a new construct to the 
language to fulfill the requirements. For instance, in [7], the authors introduced a new con-
cept (called lock), to present the security criterion in asset concepts of ISSRM in BPMN. 
Also, vulnerability point used to show the vulnerability in Risk concepts in the same lan-
guage. The idea of vulnerability point also was used in Secure Tropos too [34]. Risk treat-
ment does not have any alignment in any languages because it is a policy about how to deal 
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with risk. The alignment of security requirements presents the risk treatment and control at 
the same time. Table 2, and 3. present the summary of alignments to risk, and risk treatment 
concepts in different languages. 
Table 2. Alignment of different languages to risk treatment concepts- adapted from [14] 
ISSRM BPMN Secure Tropos Misuse Case Mal-activity 
Risk treatment - - - - 
Security require-
ment  
Task, Event, 
Gateway,  Se-
quence flow 
Actor, Hardgoal, 
Plan, Resouce, Se-
curity constraint, 
dependency, 
contribution,means-
end, decomposition 
link 
Security 
usecase, Ex-
tend and in-
clude link 
Decision, miti-
gation activity, 
control flow 
 
 
 
Control - - - Mal-swimlane 
Table 3. Alignment of different languages to risk concepts- adapted from [14] 
ISSRM BPMN Secure Tropos Misuse Case Mal-activity 
Risk 
Aggregation of 
Event and Impact 
Aggregation of 
Event and Im-
pact 
Aggregation of 
Event and Im-
pact 
Aggregation of 
Event and Im-
pact 
Impact Lock Impacts arrow 
Usecase with 
Impacts  
stereotype 
Mal-activity 
Swimlane 
Event 
Aggregation of 
vulnerability and 
Threat 
Threat or, Ag-
gregation of vul-
nerability and 
Threat 
Aggregation of 
vulnerability 
and Threat 
Aggregation of 
vulnerability 
and Threat 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability 
point 
Vulnerability 
point 
Usecase with 
Vulnerability  
stereotype 
 
Threat 
Aggregation of 
Attack method 
and Threat agent  
Goal, Plan 
Aggregation of 
Attack method 
and Threat 
agent 
Aggregation of 
Attack method 
and Threat agent 
Attack method 
Task, Event. 
Gateway, 
Sequence flows 
Plan, Task, De-
composition link 
Misuse case, in-
clude and ex-
clude links 
Mal-Decision, 
Mal-Activity, 
control flow 
links, Mal swim-
lane 
Threat agent Pool Actor Misuser Mal-swimlane 
2.3 Summary 
Fig 2. presents the process of extracting risks and risks treatments. It starts with the 
identification of important assets. Then the security objectives of this assets must be recog-
nized. The security objective of each asset comes from the asset’s role in the final product 
or service. In the next step, risk analysis part should get performed. The last three parts are 
related to the risk treatment. After identification of possible risks, we make a decision about 
the general approach to face with risk. Then, some security requirements get defined based 
on risk treatment. At the end, a set of controls are implemented. Since there is no guarantee 
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for the efficiency of the whole process, this process should be done iteratively, and the risks 
must get monitored always. 
In [14] the author classifies each class in ISSRM based on the principle of semiotic clar-
ity[22][23]. Semiotic clarity discusses the preciseness of alignment between two different 
languages. If two constructs from two different languages provide exactly the same meaning 
then there is a one to one relationship between these two elements, otherwise, it could be 
overload, incompleteness, redundancy, or under-definition. Redundancy means in the refer-
ent language, there is two or more constructs witch conveys the same meaning. Overload 
mention one given construct can be used in different alignment. Incompleteness means, 
there is no semantical equal construct in the referent language. Also, under construct refers 
to a situation when a construct has not special equivalent semantic. Table 5. shows the com-
parison of alignment of them to the ISSRM with respect to semiotic clarity.  
The current language models do not cover the main concepts of the security needed to secure 
information system. Table 4. shows the three main concepts of  ISSRM covered by the other 
models. Table 4. justifies the alignment of these languages to ISSRM. The alignment helps 
that in case that the model does not cover a concept, the missed concept get compensated 
with extra elements.  
 
 
Fig 2. The process of ISSRM, adapted from [2] 
Table 4. Summary of covered concepts in different models before alignment 
 Asset Risk Risk treatment 
BPMN     
Secure Tropos       
Misuse case diagram      
Mal-activity diagram      
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Table 5. Comparing Modelling languages in alignments of ISSRM - adapted from [14] 
Semiotic  clarity BPMN Secure Tropos Misuse cases Mal-activity  
One-to-one corre-
spondence Threat agent  Threat agent 
Security criterion, 
Vulnerability, 
Threat agent 
Impact, Threat 
agent, Control 
Redundancy Assets Event Assets 
Assets, Attack 
method 
Overload Assets Assets Assets Assets 
Incompleteness 
Security crite-
rion, Risk, Im-
pact, Event, 
Vulnerability, 
Threat, Risk 
treatment and 
control 
Risk, Impact, 
Event, Vulnerabil-
ity, Threat, Risk 
treatment and con-
trol 
Risk, Event, 
Threat, Risk treat-
ment and control 
Security crite-
rion, Risk, 
Event, Vulnera-
bility, Threat, 
Risk treatment 
Under-defini-
tion(excess) 
Assets, Attack 
method, secu-
rity require-
ment 
Asset, Security cri-
terion, Attack 
method, security 
requirement 
Asset, Attack 
method, Security 
requirement 
Asset, Security 
requirement 
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3 Attack Tree 
In this chapter, we answer  
Q1.3.What is attack tree? 
Q1.4. What is the meaning of multiset semantic? 
Q1.5..What are the concert and abstract syntax of an attack tree?  
Q1.6. What are the main measurement approaches in attack trees? 
An attack tree [15] is a top-down technique that helps to present all possible attack methods 
to a system. This model is tree [16] data structure. Every node in this tree can have several 
nodes. Each node can be decomposed to children nodes, and children nodes can also have 
their own children. Therefore the parent nodes are goals and the children nodes are the ways 
to achieve the parent. The decomposition structure continues till the leaf node shows a single 
attack. The relation between the children of a node could be Conjunctive or Disjunctive. 
Also, these relations sometimes called refinements. The Conjunctive relation means that the 
parent can be satisfied only when all the children are achieved. Meanwhile, the disjunctive 
means that the parent node could be satisfied if one of its children get achieved. There are 
many different types of attack trees like Vulnerabilities Tree [17], Protection Tree [21], De-
fense Tree [31], and Attack-Defense trees [26][27]. All of them have the above features of 
attack tree. There are only a few things which distinguish them.    
In [38] the author suggests a semantic for attack trees. Based on this semantic, the structure 
of the attack trees does not affect the interpretation of attack trees. They consider the atomic 
attacks as leaves of the tree. These atomic attacks have Boolean values based on success or 
failure of the attack. The rest of the nodes contain Boolean operators (AND, OR). The value 
of the root in this tree is the output of the function. Mauw and Oostdijk suggest the attack 
tree could have a different structure, but the final output of them should be the same.  
Additionally, in [38] the authors provide two reduction rules which keep the semantic of 
attack tree but decrease the complexity of it. At the first step, they suggest that a node is 
connected to a multi-set of nodes with an edge. They called this multi-set as a bundle. The 
rules are as following: 
1)  If in a bundle, a node has only one connection to a bundle, then this node could be 
removed and the child bundle replaces one level up.  
2) If a bundle contains a node which has a connection with two or more bundles, then 
this bundle could be replaced with two bundles. The first one contains the first bun-
dle, and the second one contains the second bundle.   
3.1 Multiset Semantic 
As it discussed before, an attack tree explains the different approaches which an attacker 
may use to achieve a given goal. Some of the steps are atomic, which means they are not 
decomposable to smaller attacks. On the other hand, some attacks are composed of smaller 
attacks. These attacks are made by smaller attacks. The atomic attacks may happen multi 
times in an attack tree. As a result, a component attack could be considered as multisets of 
atomic attacks.  
Definition: Assume the collection of component attacks is called C. Then and attack is a 
finite, none empty, multiset of attacks. Attack suit is a finite set of attacks.
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Example: Assume the set C to achieve administrator passwords is {bribe, force, install a 
key logger, access computer, find administrator}. Then the attack for this set of components 
is { find the administrator, bribe}, {find administrator, force},{access computer, install key 
logger}. The attack suit is the set of all three above sets:  
{{find administrator, bribe}, {find administrator, force},{access computer, install key log-
ger}} 
3.2 Family of Attack Tree Languages 
Defense Tree is an extension of attack tree, but in there are some countermeasures added to 
the leaf nodes of attack tree. This tree should be presented in disjunctive normal form (DNF). 
In this format, the AND nodes are the leaves of the tree. Such format simplifies the whole 
tree. 
Vulnerability Tree has a vulnerability in its root. The children are the events which could 
lead to exploiting this vulnerability. There are AND, and OR connectors to connect the 
nodes together. The connectors perform the refinements roles.  
Protection Tree is a complementary tree to avoid attacks based on attack tree. In this ap-
proach, firstly, the attack tree get designed. Then the protection tree is developed. In protec-
tion tree, there is a given node with respect to a certain node in the attack tree. The nodes in 
the protection tree present a solution to avoid the attack in the corresponded node in the 
attack tree. 
Attack-Defense tree can be considered as a zero-sum game with two players in game the-
ory. In ADTree, there are two different nodes. The opponent (attack nodes) and the propo-
nent (defense nodes). Every node regardless of its type can get refined to some children. 
The leaf nodes perform a basic action and do not refine. Additionally, every node can have 
only one child of the other type, which depicts a countermeasure for that node. The defini-
tion of Conjunctive or Disjunctive operators is alike the original attack tree. ADTree pro-
vides a countermeasure for both types of the nodes. Such feature helps to develop a possible 
attack tree to more details. Table 6. shows the ADTerm respected to each ADTree. 
In [28], the authors pointed that an Attack-Defense tree could be presented using a mathe-
matical syntax called ADTerm. The below table defines the meaning of notations in 
ADTerms. The S={Attack node(p), Countermeasure node(o)} 
Example: For an ADTrem like 𝑐𝒑 (∧𝒑 (a,b),𝑐𝒐 (d,e)) the equivalent ADTree would be fig 3. 
 
Fig 3. ADTree corresponds to the 𝑐𝒑 (∧𝒑 (a,b),𝑐𝒐 (d,e))
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Attack Graph [32] is also a technique for analyzing of network security vulnerability. A 
path in this graph present all the essential actions which attacker needs to perform to intrude 
the network. In this graph, the nodes present the state of the network during the attack. There 
are three main factors which help to generate the attack graph. These factors are Attack 
template, a detailed description of the system, and the attacker’s profile.  
Table 6-Mathematical, and Graphical representation of formalized notation 
Mathematic  expression Graphical meaning 
⋁𝒔 
There are disjunction refinement 
between children of a node 
  
⋀𝒔 
There are conjunction refinement 
between children of a node 
 
 
 
𝒄𝑺 
A countermeasure is applied on 
a node 
𝒄𝒐 
  
𝒄𝒑 
  
 
Semantic Threat Graph [33] is another technique to risk analysis. Although the attack 
trees are good in presenting high-level attacks, they have some weaknesses. Attack trees are 
not able to present the detailed security solutions. For instance, based on ADTree, a possible 
countermeasure for Denial of Service attack, would be installing a firewall. However, the 
configuration to deal with different kind of DoS attacks can be different. Additionally, the 
Semantic Threat Graph includes the other important concepts. There are four main concepts 
in the STG: threat (which basically covers the potentiality for attack), asset (which is the 
final purpose of the threat, and could be either people in the organization or infrastructure), 
vulnerability (which is a weaknesses in the assets), and countermeasure (which is an action 
or a process to mitigate the vulnerability and prevent the threat). These concepts are con-
nected to each other using directed edge. In fact, the STG is a directed graph and not a tree. 
Among all different extensions of attack tree and attack graph, the ADTree is more suit for 
the purpose of this thesis. It has the potential to present both the risk and risk-treatment 
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concept at the same time. Although the defense tree could also fulfill some needs, it can 
only show the countermeasures against attacks in leaves. Moreover, STG has the potentiality 
to present the ISSRM, but for the purpose of this thesis, we are interested in the trees. Ad-
ditionally, in [25], the authors provide a free graphical open source tool to support the AD-
Tree which is called ADTool. This tool facilitates the third part of the thesis. 
Table 7. Comparing family trees based on ISSRM concepts coverage. 
 Asset  Risk  Risk-treatment  Tree support 
Attack tree No Yes No Yes 
Defense Tree No Yes Yes (only in leaves) Yes 
Vulnerability Tree No Yes No Yes 
Protection Tree No No Yes Yes 
Attack-Defense tree No Yes Yes Yes 
Attack Graph No Yes No No 
Semantic Threat Graph Yes Yes Yes No 
3.3 Attack Tree-Defense Tree 
The elements in the nodes can have both numerical and textual values. It facilitates both 
technical and non-technical analysis [24].  A node can have different elements based on the 
final purpose of analysis [15]. For instance, cost element provides some information 
regarding the expenses of the attack for the attacker. Also, the node may provide some ele-
ments regarding the skills level of attacker, needed time of the attack, or the special equip-
ment which an attacker needs to perform the attack. Another possible attribute could be the 
likelihood of the attack. In [24], the author also used impact as a qualitative measure and 
map them to a set of numeric ranges. Additionally, the risk is included and evaluated based 
on the other element. The final evaluation of risk can be done either by Bayesian network 
methods [29], or some simpler approaches [3].In [30], the author suggests a very simple 
bottom-up approach make a quantification analysis on an attack tree. In this approach first, 
the leaf nodes get their values and then the whole tree get traversed and based on the refine-
ments between the nodes the parents get values. All of these elements facilitate analysis to 
detect the most probable attack based on some metrics. Table 7. compares the capability of 
the ISSRM coverage on different attack tree. 
3.4 Concrete Syntax 
In [25], the authors provide an open source tool for graphical representation of Attack-De-
fense trees. Fig 4 presents the concrete syntax of Attack-Defense tree. Although, the root 
node can be either defender or attacker, in this thesis we consider the root node as the attack  
node. In this tool, the only elements which a node has are its label. The label has a textual 
value that describes the objective of that node. We can consider the Attack-Defense tree as 
a game between two players [27].Moreover, it is supposed that the nodes of each player are 
a countermeasure for the other player. The refinements between two nodes from the same 
player would be a simple line. Meanwhile, the line between a node and its countermeasure 
is a cut line. Every node can have an unlimited number of children from its kind, but it can 
only have one countermeasure node. Such policy helps to keep the tree simpler [28]. By 
default the operation between children of a node is conjunctive, but it can easily get changed 
to disjunctive too.  
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Fig 4. The concrete syntax of Attack-Defense tree. 
3.5 Abstract Syntax 
Fig. 5 shows the relationship between different graphical elements of Attack-Defense tree. 
Both attack node and countermeasure node inherit the same feature from the abstract class 
of node class. An instance of Node could be either Attack Node or Defense Node. The mul-
tiplicity of Node class shows that an instance of this class may have only one cut line, but 
many line instances. The generalization of the cut line and Line from Edge class shows that 
a Node may come from either a cut line or a Line instance. Therefore, every node has only 
one parent. The attribute To_Countermeasure_Child states that every node can have only 
one countermeasure. Meanwhile, the To_Child shows one to many relations between a node 
and Line class. 
3.6 Measurement Models  
The nodes in attack tree need to get evaluated in order to provide information for the man-
agers who decide about the security of the information systems. Usually, managers look for 
the optimal level of security or return of security investment (ROSI). In order to achieve this 
goal the attack nodes should have some attributes with some quantitative values. These 
quantitative values could be the likelihood of attack, and the cost of performing of it. The 
process of quantification of attack tree is called attack tree analysis. There are two main 
approaches for this purpose. 
In one approach, first attributes of the leaves get evaluated. Then in a bottom-up approach, 
based on the values of leaves, the other nodes of the attack tree get computed. In this ap-
proach, the conjunctive nodes mean that all of the children nodes should get evaluated, but 
the order of execution of nodes and possibility of a repetition of failure nodes is not im-
portant. 
Alternatively, analysis of an attack tree could be considered as a Boolean function. An attack 
tree like A can be refined to several simpler attacks like 𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑚. The two main re-
finements are: 
“AND” ,also called conjunction, refinement A=𝐴1 ∧ 𝐴2 ∧ … ∧ 𝐴𝑚 means to materialize the 
A all the children 𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑚 should happen. 
“OR” ,also called disjunction refinement A=𝐴1 ∨ 𝐴2 ∨ … ∨ 𝐴𝑚 means to materialize the A 
at least one of the children 𝐴1, 𝐴2, … , 𝐴𝑚 should happen. 
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Fig 5. The abstract syntax of Attack-Defense tree. 
The whole attack tree can be shown as recursive function with some nodes which none of 
the refinements can apply to them (𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑚). These are the leaves node that called 
atomic nodes. Therefore, the attack tree is A can be presented with a Boolean monotone 
function like A(𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑚). The function gets a set of steps (atomic attack nodes in 
leaves) and the output of the function is the result of analysis (1 the attacker win, or 0 at-
tacker lost the game).For a given node like 𝑋𝑖 the values could be true, false, or ⊥
(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦). This means 
the given set of steps can lead to a successful attack at the end or not. These steps are called 
attack suites. The other concept in this approach is attack strategy, which decides the next 
step of the attacker based on the previous results. In other word, attack strategy clarifies if 
the attacker can repeat a failure attack, the order of the chosen steps, and the condition to 
leave the attack scenario.   
3.6.1 Multi-Parameter Attack Tree Analysis 
In [39] the authors suggested the rational financial reasoning for the attackers as following: 
1) The attacker attacks the system only if the value of the attack overweight the costs 
of it. 
2) The attacker always chooses the optimal way to attack. 
Based on these two rules, we can decide an information system target is safe only if the 
attacker does not achieve benefit from attacking the system.   
Although, many people tried this approach with only one parameter at the time, in [39] the 
authors suggest multi-parameter attack trees, which benefits from game theory and rational 
economic reasoning to perform the attack tree analysis. Using this method, it is possible to 
estimate cost and probability of success, then using the rational reasoning and game theory, 
we can decide if the information system really is attacked or not. 
They consider that the chance of a successful attack in an attack node is p, and the chance 
of getting arrested after a successful attack is q. The attacker pays a certain Cost to perform 
the attack. In case the attacker is arrested he should pay a penalty. The penalty of a successful 
attack is π. It is also possible that the attacker is arrested after a not successful attack. This 
20 
 
probability is mentioned as 𝒒−. In this case his penalty would be 𝝅− .In case the attacker 
successfully perform the attack, he achieves some Gain. Table 8. summarizes the whole 
possibilities with their probabilities. The probabilities of q and 𝒒−  and the value of 𝝅− and 
𝝅− is not necessarily the same. Therefore, in the leaf node there are four parameters to eval-
uate (Cost, p, π, 𝝅−). 
Table 8. summary of attack actions and the outcome of them 
Attack Success/Probability Attacker get arrested/Probability Final outcome 
Yes /p No/1-q P*Gains-Cost 
Yes/p Yes/q P*Gains-Cost- π 
No/1-p No/1-𝒒− Cost 
No/1-p Yes/𝒒− -Cost-𝝅− 
The general formulae to calculate the final outcome of the attack is: 
Outcome=-Cost+p*(Gains- π)-(1-p)* 𝝅− 
The authors considered the atomic attacks in leaves as independent attacks. Then, they pro-
vided formulas for computing the parameters for AND nodes and OR nodes.The presented 
attack tree analysis method has three main shortcomings: 
1) It considers the attack leaves as independent events. In the real world, the atomic 
attacks may not be independent. It makes the problem when there is an AND node 
in the tree. In this case, the values of one child may propagate to parents more than 
once. Fig 6. shows a dependent tree. 
2) This model is not compatible with the semantic provided in [38] 
3) The notation of attacker behavior, preferences, and his strategy is not considered in 
this model. This model does not provide any information about the order of attack 
node to get performed. Additionally, it does not clarify when the attacker stops the 
game.  
Fig 6. Dependent Tree 
In part 2.2, we have mentioned that a threat agent in risk concepts in ISSRM is described 
with his motive, capabilities, opportunities, and means. Except for the motive, the rest of 
factors affects the p in the parallel model, meanwhile the π, 𝝅−, q, 𝒒−  are social elements 
and are not affected by the feature of threat agent.  Table 9.shows the relationship between 
attack parameters in [39] and threat agent attributes in ISSRM 
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Table 9. correlation between attack parameters in [39] and ISSRM threat agent 
Attack Parameters in [39] Threat agent parameters in ISSRM 
P (possibility of success in an attack) Capabilities, Opportunities, Means 
π, 𝜋−,q , 𝑞− -- 
3.6.2 Parallel Model 
In [40] the authors presented a new analysis model to compensate the shortcomings of [39]. 
This method is also base on monotone function. The following is the procedure to perform 
it: 
 Create the attack tree and evaluate the value of leaves with the four parameters in 
[39]. 
 The attacker finds all the potential attack suites. Some of these attack suites can lead 
to a positive result in the root. These attack suites should be evaluated. 
 The attacker computes the outcome of all the attack suites which lead to a true result 
in the root. Then, he chooses the one with the highest outcome. 
 Since this method works with Boolean function, therefore it does not depend on the struc-
ture of the tree in the analysis. As a result, it fixes the shortcoming of [39] related to the 
inconsistency with semantic of attack tree. It also solves the problem related to the depend-
ency of attack steps. Although this model resolves two major problems, it still suffers from 
some issues. The attacker strategy mentions that the attacker performs the whole attack 
suites, but he has only one trial which is a paradox. Also, in case the attack tree is big, 
performing all the attack suites increase the complexity of analysis. 
3.6.3 Serial Model 
Serial model [41] is an extension of the parallel model. In this model, the attacker tries to 
smartly not to perform all the leaves which have not any effect on the final result of the 
Boolean function.  The attacker is not allowed to repeat a failure attack, but he can choose 
the order of his attacks in advance, but later he can refuse to perform some of them. Here is 
the complete strategy of the attacker in this model. 
1) Create an attack tree with a set of leaves 𝑿 = {𝑿𝒊: 𝒊 = 𝟏, 𝟐, … , 𝒏}. 
2) Consider a subtree 𝜎 of X  (𝜎⊆ X) which materialize the root value as true. 
3) Consider a permutation 𝛼 of 𝜎. 
4) Compute the outcome considering the 𝜎 and the 𝛼. 
5) Find the maximum outcome among all the choices for 𝜎 and the 𝛼. 
Although, this model tries to skip some of the paths in the attack tree it still suffers from 
complexity because all the combination of leaves which leads to materializing the root 
should be evaluated. Additionally, however, the model provides more information for at-
tacker strategy it still is not compatible with the attacks in daily life. It may happen that the 
attacker tries some attacks and based on their results chooses the order or combination of 
attack steps. Also, in some cases, the attacker should follow an exact order of attacks which 
is not changeable. 
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3.6.4 Fully Adaptive Model 
The authors of [42] present a new model to fix the complexity issue in the previous model. 
They suggested computing the upper bound of the outcome. If the upper bound of outcome 
is negative, then it means the expenses of attack are more than the costs, therefore the system 
is secure. Also, the article suggests recursive formulae compute the exact outcome. The 
model resolves the complexity problem, but the attacker strategy still has some problems. 
The model suggests that the attacker can only perform every attack once, meanwhile it is 
not true in real world. Also, in case the attacker get arrested, then the attacker would be 
game over, meanwhile the attacker can continue to attack even after arresting.  For a Bool-
ean monotone function like F(𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑚) the 𝑥𝑗 is an input variable corresponds to the 
atomic attack 𝑥𝑗 the exact utility at node j is 𝑈𝑗 
𝑈𝑗 = −𝐶𝑗 − (1 − 𝑝𝑗 − 𝑞𝑗) ∗ 𝜋𝑗+𝑞𝑗*𝑈(𝐴𝑥𝑗=0)
+ 𝑝𝑗 ∗ 𝑈(𝐴𝑥𝑗=1)
 
The authors showed that in case of And refinement between atomic nodes the optimal choice 
to maximize the outcome is 
𝐶𝑖
1−𝑝𝑖
, and in case of Or refinement 
𝑈(𝑋𝑖)
1−𝑞𝑖
 
The fully adaptive model can be used when an atomic attack is repeated in the other sub-
trees. If there is a repeatable attack, its cost should be reduced to the whole numbers of 
attack. Here is the algorithm to which works with uniform cost reduction.  
1) Reduce the cost of repeatable actions to 
𝐶
1−𝑞
 
2) Sort all the new nodes by 
𝐶
1−𝑝
. The node with the lowest ratio should be the first node 
in subtree. 
3) Compute U(A) for each subtree.   
Table 10-summary of problems of monotone Boolean function methods 
Model\Issue 
Independent 
nodes 
Compatibility 
with [38] Attacker Strategy Complexity One trial 
Multi-parameter          
Parallel         
Serial         
Fully Adaptive        
3.6.5 Vulnerability Tree Analysis 
In [17], the authors also suggested a solution to analyses the vulnerability tree. Based on this 
approach, the damage analysis table is a table which its rows show the attacks in the leaves 
and the columns contain the analysis. The first column is the list of damages, and later this 
list will be categorized to fewer classes of damages. The next column contains the evaluation 
of each category in the first column. The third column in damage table is the probability of 
each attack based on the previous history. The fourth column is the financial risk value 
which can be calculated using the probability of occurrence of the attack multiply by the 
value of the damage. The final column is the normalized damage which is a value between 
1 to 100.  
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3.6.6 Protection Tree Analysis 
In [21], every node in the attack tree node has four attributes. The attributes are risk, impact, 
cost, and probability of success. The impact is the effect of the attack on the system which 
is a value from 1 to 10 and is extracted from a given table which describes the effect of 
attacks in the system for a certain range of numbers. Probability and cost are derived from 
historical data. The article used a bottom-up approach to evaluating the other nodes in the 
tree.  They have considered the nodes in the tree as an independent node.  
3.6.7 Defense Tree Analysis 
In [31], the authors suggested an economic framework evaluate the effect of adding coun-
termeasures to the leaves of attack tree. The metric to measure the economic gain of the 
attacker is Return of Attack, which is the gain of the attacker when he performs an attack. 
The other quality to evaluate countermeasure node is the ROI, which is the return of invest-
ment. This metric extracts from annual expenses of security damages from attacks, the cost 
of security investment, and risk mitigation (RM) which shows the effectiveness of counter-
measure and its value is from 0 to 1. Using both ROI and ROA simultaneously helps to 
better evaluate the effect of used countermeasures. Table 10 presents the summary of the 
whole methods to analyze the attack trees. 
3.6.8 Attack Tree/Attack-Defense Tree Analysis 
In [28] the authors formalize the bottom-up analysis of Attack-Defense tree using a mathe-
matical approach. Assume we have a set of parent nodes (T) in the ADTree and the set L 
involves all the leaves of ADTree. For an attribute like 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒1 in the 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒1∈ T, the α 
is a recursive function which assigns the attribute of the node to a value from set (V).  The 
set V can be defined based on 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒1, and the operation of α. The 𝛽 is a function which 
assigns the attribute of a node from set L a value from set V.  The children of 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒1 makes 
the set C.  
α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒1)={
𝛽  (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒1)                                             , 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒1  ∈   L
𝐼
(α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒i)
,..,α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒k)
)
,     𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒1  ∈   T, 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒i  ∈   C  
𝐼
(α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒2),..,α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒k)
)
 is a function which defines the computational arithmetic based on the 
refinement of nodes. In this thesis we call this function ADTree creator function. This func-
tion should formulate all different refinements:  
𝐼
(α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒2),..,α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒k)
)
= {
𝐼(⋁𝑠)                        , Disjunction between argumants , s ∈ S 
𝐼(⋀𝑠)                       ,  Conjunction between argumants , s ∈ S 
𝐼(𝑐𝑆)                  , 2 sibelling nodes from two different players
 
Example 
Consider the below ADTree on Fig 7. We are going to calculate the probability of successful 
attack in the root. In this case, the α function is the function which assigns a value from 
range [0,1] to a given node. The 𝛽 function is derived based on historical data as following: 
𝛽 (𝑎)=0.2, 𝛽 (𝑏) = 0.7, 𝛽 (𝑑) = 0.9 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 (𝑒)=0.1. Also 𝐼(α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒2),..,α (𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒k))
 is defined with: 
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𝐼(⋁𝑠) = ∑(−1)
𝑘−1 ∑ α (𝑇I)
𝐼⊆{1,..,𝑛}
|𝐼|=𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
 
𝐼(∧𝑠) = ∏ α 𝑖
∀ 𝑖 ∈𝐶
 
𝐼(c𝑠) = I (𝑥,𝑦) =  α 𝑥 ∗ (1 − α 𝑦) 
 
 
Fig 7. sample ADTree to perform bottom-up 
analysis 
To evaluate the I(root), we need to follow the corresponding ADTrem of this ADTree which 
is: 𝑐𝒑 (∧𝒑 (a,b),𝑐𝒐 (d,e)) 
𝐼(𝐼(𝑎,𝑏),𝐼(𝑑,𝑒))=𝐼(𝑎,𝑏) ∗ (1 − 𝐼(𝑑,𝑒)) 
𝐼(𝑎,𝑏)=0.7*0.2=0.14 
𝐼(𝑐,𝑑) = 𝐼(𝑎,𝑏) ∗ (1 − 𝐼(𝑑,𝑒))=0.14*(1-0.9*(1-0.1))=0.0266 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the different extensions of attack tree. The multiset se-
mantic, and Boolean terms explain how an attack tree could be expressed with mathematical 
notation. There are also two main approaches to evaluate the severity of the risk. These two 
approaches are bottom-up, and Boolean function. Also, we defined the minimum acceptable 
level of security when the costs of attacks for an attacker is more than the benefits of it. 
Table 11-The summary of some methods to analyze the attack trees. 
Method Approach Metrics 
 Bottom-up Boolean function  
Multi-parameter    P,π, 𝝅−,q , 𝒒− 
Parallel Model    P,π, 𝝅−,q , 𝒒− 
Serial Model    P,π, 𝝅−,q , 𝒒− 
Fully Adaptive    P,π, 𝝅−,q , 𝒒− 
 Attack Tree     the probability of success 
Attack-Defense tree     the probability of success 
Vulnerability Tree    Attack Cost, Probability, Risk value  
Protection Tree    Risk, Impact, Cost, Probability 
Defense Tree    ROI,ROA 
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Part II: Contribution 
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4 Alignment of Attack-Defense tree to ISSRM 
In this chapter, we answer 
Q2.1.What attack tree constructs could be aligned to the ISSRM domain model? 
As it is discussed before, the ISSRM by itself is only a class diagram in UML. It is also, 
important to improve the modeling languages in order to be able to show the concepts of 
ISSRM in design level. In this chapter, we are going to make an alignment from Attack-
Defense tree to ISSRM. 
4.1 ADTree Alignment to ISSRM 
Asset and vulnerabilities: The asset nodes are extracted from the text description of the 
attacks, and the label analysis of attack tree. Sometimes vulnerabilities are not explicitly 
mentioned in the text, but the attack description reveals it. For instance, consider the label 
of an attack node is “intercepting the wireless signal”. In this case, we can consider the 
wireless signal, and the wireless modem as assets, and the interceptable signal as a vulner-
ability.  
Risk treatment concepts: We add security requirements using the countermeasure nodes 
on ADTree. These security requirements are written in “shall be” format, the rest of coun-
termeasure nodes which are not in “shall be” format are considered as control. The cost 
attribute in the countermeasure node describes the expenses of implementation of control or 
security requirement. Also, the cut line acts as the mitigate association, when the counter-
measure node is a child of an attack node.  
Fig 8 shows the aligned ADTree (A-ADTree) which is capable of representing the main 
concepts of ISSRM.  The combination of motive, capabilities, opportunities, and means 
make the threat agent. Since every attack node has a threat agent inside it explicitly, we 
connect the threat agent classes to the attack node using aggregation association. Addition-
ally, the attack node exploits the vulnerabilities, and threaten the assets. Table 16. also, 
shows the alignment of new ADTree to the ISSRM concepts. 
4.2 Attribute of Nodes  
 As the summary of the previous chapter showed, the probability of a successful attack is 
always considered as an attribute of nodes. This probability (P) can get extracted from the 
previous history of attacks on the system. Also, (Cost) of attack is important, because we 
are considering the analysis based on an economic framework. Cost can be evaluated from 
features of the attacker (Motive, Capabilities, Opportunities, Means), and the countermeas-
ure node. Moreover, by applying the countermeasure nodes on an attack node the probability 
of success will decrease and the cost of attack will increase. In case the attacker successfully 
performs the attack he gains some benefit (Gain). We consider the value of attacked asset 
as a maximum gain of the attacker. Additionally, the countermeasure nodes have cost at-
tribute, which shows the cost of implementation of it. This value cannot be more than the 
value of targeted asset. The following table shows the attribute of new AD Tree node. Table 
12. Presents the equivalent concrete syntax in ISSRM, and A-ADTree.  
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Fig 8. New A-ADTree abstract syntax 
Table 12. alignment of A-ADTree to ISSRM 
ISSRM New ADTree 
Security requirement 
Controls 
Countermeasure node 
Line 
Vulnerability Vulnerability 
Asset Asset 
Threat agent Aggregation of motive, capabilities, opportunities, and means 
Attack method 
Aggregation of attack node, motive, capabilities, opportuni-
ties, and means, and line 
Risk 
Aggregation of vulnerability, attack node, motive, capabili-
ties, opportunities, and means, and line 
mitigate Cut line 
4.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we tried to first align the context which covers similar concepts in ADTree, 
and ISSRM to each other. We found out, some of the concepts in the ISSRM are not covered 
in the ADTree. Therefore, we added these concepts to the ADTree. The final, ADTree com-
ponent covers the concepts of the threat agent, asset, vulnerability, attack method, risks, and 
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risk treatment. We call this new ADTree as Aligned ADTree (A-ADTree). Table 13. ex-
plains different parameters in each node of A-ADTree, but we describe it more in detail in 
next chapter. 
Table 13- Attribute of A-ADTree and the approach to evaluate 
Node Attribute Evaluation 
Attack Node 
Outcome Fully adaptive approach 
Probability of successful Attack (P) 
Derived from historical data 
and OCTAVE  
Gain of successful Attack (Gain) Asset Value 
Cost of attack 
Derived from threat agent 
score of attacker, and coun-
termeasures 
Countermeasure Node 
Cost of implementation (𝑪𝒄) 
 𝑪𝒄 < asset value 
Probability of success Derived from historical data 
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5 Risk Severity vs Countermeasure Effectiveness Evaluation    
Each node in the A-ADTree may have several metrics. In this thesis, we considered proba-
bility of success, and cost of the node. The added concepts such as vulnerability, and asset 
helps to measure these metric more precisely. In this chapter, we answer the below question. 
Q2.2 What is the evaluation of metrics in both attack, and defense nodes? 
5.1 Evaluation of probability using OCTAVE method 
It is not possible to evaluate the probability of an atomic attack based log files or monitored 
measures in an information system. Vestiges of a given atomic attack may be found on 
several different measures (network log files, network traffic, firewall logs, OS services), 
and some of them may not get monitored in the information system. Additionally, it could 
be hard to evaluate a probability of a successful attack based only based on monitored 
measures, since some of the atomic attacks could be very abstract. On the other hand, we 
can evaluate the probabilities subjectively. In this approach, a person tries to estimate the 
probability of an event based on a set of evidence. Clearly, this approach is not precise, and 
a person may evaluate same events in the same situation differently, but we can increase the 
chance of correctness, by considering relevant measures. One of this most important infor-
mation could be the attribute of the threat agent (capabilities, motive, opportunities, and 
means). Also, the person in the position of network security, and a person familiar with 
the industry sectors can evaluate this probability.  
The OCTAVE [37] method is a combination of classical, and subjective evaluation of prob-
abilities. This approach consists of three main steps: 
1) Information gathering about threat agent, target assets, and the other factors which 
may affect the probability of occurrence of an attack. Also, there is a need to histor-
ical data about previous attacks, and periodical duration of each attack. 
2) Define the criteria for evaluation of probabilities. In this thesis, we have defined the 
below criteria. 
Table 14- Qualitative value of attacks 
Very High More than three times in a year 
High Two or three times in a year 
Medium Once in a year 
Low Three or four times in the last 5 years 
Very Low  one or two times in the last 5 years  
3) Assign the atomic attacks a qualitative value from the second step based on historical 
data of attacks, threat agent attributes, and expertise of selected people. 
The previous three steps provide a qualitative evaluation of probabilities, but regarding this 
thesis, we need to a quantitative analysis of probabilities too. The below table provides the 
respective quantitative value for each criterion. 
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Table 15. Quantitative value of attacks 
Qualitative value  Definition Quantitative value 
Very High More than 16 times in last 5 years 90% 
High 6 - 15 times in last 5 years 70% 
Medium Five times in last 5 years 50% 
Low Three or four times in the last 5 years 20% 
Very Low  Zero, one or two times in the last 5 years  10% 
5.2 Historical data format 
We mention in the OCTAVE we need historical data, in this section, we introduce the format 
of this historical data. These data should be kept in three tables in a database. Fig 9 shows 
the table of data in database. 
Asset Table: This table keeps the information of the targeted assets. Field times is the av-
erage number of times which this asset get attacked during the last 5 years. After each suc-
cessful or not successful attack, this field should increment by one. 
Table 16. Asset Historical Data 
field Description 
Name Name of asset 
description Description of asset 
Value Value of asset in a certain currency 
Times Average number of attacked on the asset 
Threat Agent Table: We can consider each threat agent as a vector with four dimensions 
(Means, Motives, Capabilities, Opportunities). We evaluate motives, capabilities from 1 to 
11.  One is the lowest point and 11 is the highest point. The opportunity varies between 0 
and 10. 0 means the threat agent has no opportunity to access the system (either remotely, 
or physically), and Infinite means the threat agent has no limitation for accessing the infor-
mation system. Tables 1 to 4 shows the evaluation of each attribute.  
Table 17. Evaluation of motivation attribute of threat agent-Adapted from [43] 
 Motivation 
 Curiosity Personal fame Personal Gain Revenge National interest Ideology 
Score 1 3 5 7 9 11 
Table 18. Evaluation of capabilities attribute of threat agent-Adapted from [43] 
 Capabilities 
  Beginner Undergraduate Master Specialist 
Score 1 4 7 10 
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Table 19. Evaluation of opportunities attribute of threat agent 
 Opportunities (Number of trial tries) 
 Zero One Finite Infinite 
Score 0 1 4 10 
In [37], the author points to different kind of assets which can be considered here as means. In 
table 4 we considered 5 scores for each item. For instance, if the threat agent has three item of 
table 4, his score for means attribute will be 5*3=15.  
Table 20. Evaluation of means attribute of threat agent-Adapted from [37] 
 Means 
 Computer means People as asset Process as assets Intangible assets Stepstone assets 
Score 5 5 5 5 5 
Here computer means refers to, computer, laptops, networks and all the hardware infrastructure 
in the cyberspace. People in a different position and places like citizens, immigrants, sale people 
also can be considered as an asset. Additionally, some process like hiring employee, manufac-
turing are the means for the threat agent. In case that the threat agent has a reputation, stock 
price, intellectual property, he has some intangible tools. Finally, step stone assets are authenti-
cation data or remote network access. 
Up to now, we have defined the attributes of a threat agent. Also, we have defined how can we 
evaluate each of these attributes. Now, to consider a general score for the threat agent, we can 
use the below formula: 
Threat agent score= (Capability score+ Means Score+ Motivation score )*opportunity score/4 
The multiplicity operation explains that in case that the threat agent does not have a trial chance 
for the attack, his skills, motivations, and means cannot effect his final score. On the other hand, 
if the threat agent has infinite trials then he would be more dangerous. The maximum score of 
threat agent is 115 and the minimum is 0. 
Definition: Assume t is a threat agent vector, we define coefficient of threat agent using 
function g(t) as below.  
Threat agent coefficient = g(t)= 𝑻𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕 𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆/𝟏𝟏𝟓 
Example: Assume for a certain attack the threat agent profile is estimated with:  
( Means:25, Motives:9,Capabilities:6,Opportunities:4). Therefore, we have the following 
metrics: 
Threat Agent Score=(6+25+9)*4/(4*150)=0.26 
Attack Table: This table keeps the essential data regarding the attack. Here we introduce 
each field and we describe how to evaluate each one. Table 21. Shows the field of atomic 
attack table in database. 
Impact table: This table describes what kind of effect it has on the targeted asset. The im-
pact is not supported in the A-ADTree as a concept, but it helps the expert team to consider 
the impact when they are assigning the values to other concepts. The concept may have one 
of the values defined in ISSRM. Table 22. explains the fields of asset table in database. 
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Table 21. Attack Historical Data 
Field Description 
Name Name of attack method 
Description Explain how does this attack happen 
AssetID Foreign key of asset 
Date Date of attack 
Success Average Times attack successfully happened in last 5 years  
Times Average Times attack happened in last 5 years 
CountermeasureID Foreign key of countermeasure table 
Cost of Damage (Gain) Estimation of possible costs of attack damage by expert team 
Cost of attack Estimation of cost of attack by expert team 
Table 22. Asset Historical Data 
Field Values 
Impact Loss of integrity 
Loss of availability 
Loss of confidentiality 
Loss of confidentiality, and integrity 
Loss of confidentiality, and availability 
Loss of integrity, and availability 
Loss of integrity, and availability, confidentiality 
Description Explanation of how impact of attack affects the system 
Level One, Two, Three 
Vulnerability: This table contains the vulnerabilities of the asset. The A-ADTree and the 
ISSRM have covered the vulnerabilities of the asset. A vulnerability has a level value, which 
shows the severity of it. Table 23. explains each field of vulnerability table. Also, every 
vulnerability may lead to an impact. Therefore, there is a foreign key into the table. 
Table 23. Field of vulnerability table in database 
Field Values 
Name Vulnerability name 
Description Explanation of how impact of attack affects the information system 
Level One, Two, Three 
impactId Foreign key of impact 
Countermeasure Table: The countermeasure node could be any hardware or software 
which is applied on a certain attack method, in order to mitigate or avoid it. Every counter-
measure may fail from its mission. Therefore, we can obtain the probability of success of it 
based on its failures. 
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Table 24. Countermeasure Historical Data 
Field Description 
Name Name of attack method 
Description Explain how does this attack happen 
Cost Cost of implementation of attack 
AttackID Foreign key of attack method which may apply  
FailureTimes Average time of failures in last 5 years  
Can be obtained from Success field of attack and Table 15 
5.3    Evaluation of Probability of Attack 
We mentioned that in OCTAVE we use both classical and subjective approach to quantify 
the value of probability. It would be very easy to use the table 15, but it does not mention 
how the other parameters like threat agent profile, or target asset affect the value of 
probability. To implement the effect of threat agent and the targeted asset, we used the 
Bayes’ theorem.  
Definition:  
“Attack” is the event of an atomic attack performed successfully. 
“Asset” is the event that a given asset is attacked. 
 In this case, the P(Atomic Attack |Asset) is the probability of atomic attack happens suc-
cessfully, given the Asset was targeted.  
 
𝑷(𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌|𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕) =
  𝑷(𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 ∩ 𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌)
𝑷(𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕)
 
 
Table 29.  different statements needed for evaluating the P(atomic attack| asset) 
Statement Description 
𝑃(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘|𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) The probability of Attack, given the Asset, was targeted 
           𝑃(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∩  𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘) The probability of happening Atomic attack on Asset 
Can be obtained from join of Attack and Assets tables 
𝑃(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) Can be obtained from Asset table, and Table 15 
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Fig 9. Relationship of historical data tables 
Definition:  
“Attack” is the event of an atomic attack performed successfully. 
“Asset” is the event that a given asset is attacked. 
“CTA” is the coefficient of a given threat agent. 
We can apply the effect of threat agent on the probability of successful attack over an 
asset using, multiplication of threat agent coefficient on the probability of attack. 
Probability of attack on asset consideration the threat agent profile= 𝑃(𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘|𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡) ∗ CTA 
5.4 Evaluation of probability of success in countermeasure node 
𝑷𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 is the probability that the countermeasure node detect and resist against the 
attack and leads to failure of the attack. Fig 10 shows the classification of attacks. 
𝑷𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆 = 1-Failure 
Failure is the probability that the attack get detected by the countermeasure node, but the 
attacker performs the attack successfully. The Failure could be estimated using the counter-
measure node and Table 16. The below image explains that we need to know about the 
success rate of atomic attack to evaluate the failure probability of countermeasures. 
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Fig 10. Classification of attacks 
5.5 Example 
Assume a threat agent with a profile such as { Means:25, Motives:9, Capabilities:6, 
Opportunities:4} attacked with DOS attack method to a router. The router was targeted 20 
times in the last 5 years with different attacks.  The DOS happened 12 times. DOS is one of 
the common attacks and has happened more than 30 times in the last 5 years on different 
assets in an information system. The company has set a firewall to mitigate this kind of 
attacks over the router since 5 years ago and it costs 8000€. The firewall has detected and 
stopped 10 out of 12, one attack was not detected, and one attack was detected but performed 
successfully DOS attacks on the router. Table 30. shows the evaluation probability of attack 
and countermeasure node. 
Table 30. risk evaluation of example 
Evaluation approach Description 
Atomic Attack DOS 
Asset ROUTER 
Threat Agent coefficient=0.26 (6+25+9)*4/4*150=0.26 
P(ROUTER| DOS) =12/20=0.6 Fraction of DOS attack on all the attacks on router 
P(DOS)=0.7 
 
Extracted from probability table 
P(ROUTER) =0.2 
Failure probability of firewall=1/12 
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5.6 Summary 
Figure 11 and table 31 explain the process of making an aligned Attack-Defense tree. There 
are few differences between this process and ISSRM and it comes from the fact that in A-
ADTree we do not have some of ISSRM detailed classes like security objective, risk treat-
ment, and control selection. The table describes, the whole process in separate steps with 
more details. 
 
 
Fig 11- A-ADTree Process 
Table 31-A-ADTree process 
A-ADTree Process Steps include 
Context and asset identification Build Asset table 
Risk analysis Build historical data 
Security requirement and definition  Add countermeasure nodes on previous at-
tack tree 
Severity evaluation Evaluate the parameters of each node 
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6 Bottom-Up Approach in Aligned Attack-Defense tree 
In the previous chapter, we explained how an atomic node (either atomic attack, or a coun-
termeasure) nodes get evaluated. In this chapter we discuss, how the effect of leaf nodes 
propagates up to the parent nodes, and the root. The approaches in this chapter is true both 
for attack, and countermeasure nodes.We answer  
Q.2.3 What is the new measurement model in aligned Attack-Defense tree? 
There could be three different approaches for threat agent to choose the nodes. Threat agent 
can choose based on cost, probability, or both (probability and cost)  
Assumption 
Given that a node has children such as {𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝟏, 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝟐, … , 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝒏}. We point to the 
cost of the ith children with 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕𝒊, and the probability of same children with 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒊 
6.1 Cost Oriented Approach 
In this approach, the threat agent tries to choose the option which makes the minimum cost. 
The cost of parent nodes with conjunction operation is equal to the sum of all children. But, 
when the parent has disjunction operation, the threat agent choose the child which has the 
minimum cost, regardless of its probability of success. Table 32. shows the cost evaluation 
of  cost for attack nodes, but the same formula is used for countermeasure node. 
Table 32. Minimum Cost for Attack Tree 
Graphical presentation Selection metric 
 
 
 
𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐨𝐭 = 𝐦𝐢𝐧{𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝟏, 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝟐, . . , 𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐤, } 
 
 
 
 
𝐜𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐨𝐭 = ∑ 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝒊. 𝒄𝒐𝒔𝒕
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
  
 
 
Expert team should decide 
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Example: Figure 12 shows an attack tree which has two atomic attack nodes. The cost for 
the first child node is 300€ and the cost for the second child is 800€. Since the refinement 
in the parent node is Conjunctive (AND), the cost for the parent node is 300+800=1100. 
Also, there is an countermeasure in the root node which increases the costs of the root. The 
expert team can evaluate the effect of the countermeasure on the cost. 
 
Fig 12. Example of attack-defense tree with given costs on atomic nodes 
6.2 Probability oriented approach 
In this approach, we choose the options which make the maximize probability of success. 
The probability of parent nodes with conjunction operation is equal to the multiplication of 
all probability children. Here we assume the atomic actions are independent. But, when the 
parent has disjunction operation, the threat agent choose the child which has the maximum 
chance, regardless of its cost. Table 33. shows the probability evaluation of  cost for attack 
nodes, but the same formula is used for countermeasure node. 
Example: Figure 13 shows an attack tree which has two atomic attack nodes. The probabil-
ity of the first child node is 0.3 and the probability of the second child is 0.4. Since the 
refinement in the parent node is Conjunctive (AND), the probability of the parent node is 
0.3*0.4=0.12. Also, there is a countermeasure in the root node which decreases the proba-
bility of the root. Regardless of the countermeasure the probability of the root node comes 
from its only attack child (0.12). Considering the countermeasure the probability of the root 
is equal to 0.2*0.12=0.024 
 
 
Fig 13. Example of attack-defense tree with given costs on atomic nodes 
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Table 33. Maximum Probability for Attack Tree 
Graphical meaning Selection metric 
 
 
 
𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐫𝐨𝐨𝐭 = 𝐌𝐚𝐱{𝐩𝐫𝐨𝟏, 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝟐, . . , 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐤, } 
 
 
 
 
𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐫𝐨𝐨𝐭 = ∏ 𝒄𝒉𝒊𝒍𝒅𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒊. 𝒑𝒓𝒐
𝒌
𝒊=𝟏
 
  
Assume: probability of parent node regardless of the counter-
measure is 𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐠𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐥 − 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐭 
 
𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐭 = 𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐠𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐥 − 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐭 ∗ (𝟏 − 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐥𝐝) 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed how bottom-up approach happen in the aligned Attack-Defense 
tree. In the first step, the probability and cost of atomic nodes should be evaluated. This 
evaluation should happen both for the countermeasure, and attack nodes, and we have dis-
cussed it in the previous chapter. Then, there could be two different approaches for both 
attacks and defense trees. The approaches of attack tree are independent of approaches in 
countermeasure nodes. It means that, although the threat agent may choose its options based 
on probability, the defender team may choose options based on minimum cost.
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Part III: Validation (proof of concept) 
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7 Major Information About the Implemented Tool 
During this master thesis, we have developed a tool to shows the aligned ADTree. We used 
java, sqlite for storage. The source code of this tool exists in this repository.The basic of this 
project has been developed by authors of [25].We have continued this open source project  
and added some features to it in order to be able to show an aligned ADTree.The basic code 
of the ADTool exists in this link.In this chapter, we answer 
Q3.1 What is design for implementation of aligned Attack-Defense tree?  
7.1 Major Usecases of the Tool 
Table 34. shows the main functional requirements of A-ADTree. The main usecases in the 
implemented aligned ADTree is about importing data related to the atomic attack, and coun-
termeasure, and then create an ADTree based on them.  The basic data to make an ADTree 
are the impact of an attack, vulnerability of assets, assets, atomic attack and atomic coun-
termeasures. Once the Aligned ADTree is made, the user is able to assign each atomic node 
an atomic action. Atomic actions (atomic attack, or atomic countermeasure) are already in-
serted in the database. At the end, the user can obtain the level of the risk in each attack 
node, by seeing the properties of each node. 
Table 34- Functional Requirements of A-ADTree 
ID Requirement 
1 The A-ADTree shall be able to keep impact data with name, level, and description of impact  
2 The A-ADTree shall be able to keep vulnerability data with name, level, and description of 
vulnerability  
3 The A-ADTree shall be able to keep asset data with name, vulnerability, description, and 
value of the asset. 
4 The A-ADTree shall be able to keep atomic attacks data with name, description, the cost of 
attack, the cost of treatment, and the probability of success of attack method of it. 
5 The A-ADTree shall be able to keep atomic countermeasure data with name, description, 
cost of implementation, and  probability of success 
6 The A-ADTree shall be able to show the profile of threat agent based on his capability, 
motivation, means, and opportunities.   
7 The A-ADTree shall be able to suggest values to assign to atomic nodes 
8 The A-ADTree shall be able to connect the visual nodes as a tree to each other 
9 The A-ADTree shall be able to show the probability of success of attack nodes 
10 The A-ADTree shall be able to show the cost of attack node 
11 The A-ADTree shall be able to show the effect of threat agent profile on attack nodes 
12 The A-ADTree shall be able to show the effect of countermeasure nodes on attack nodes. 
13 The A-ADTree shall be able to suggest options to select the children on disjunctive nodes 
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7.2 List of Requirements 
Here we briefly enumerate the list of requirements of the aligned ADTree(A-ADTree). Each 
requirement is linked to the respected usecases in Appendix II. 
7.3 Architecture of Tool 
There are three main components in the A-ADTree.  
1) The database which is responsible for keeping the data respected to the impact, vul-
nerability, asset, atomic attacks, and atomic countermeasures. 
2) Computational Component which is responsible for evaluating the risk, the severity 
of the risk, the probability of success of nodes. It also contains information about the 
structure of ADTree. 
3) A graphical component which is responsible for presenting the attack nodes, and 
countermeasure nodes. 
Figure 14 explains how these three components are related to each other. Every time the 
user make a change on the graphical component, these changes are applied to the database, 
and structure of the tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Fig 14. Abstract architecture of the A-ADTree 
7.4 Limitation of the Tool 
The A-ADTree does not cover the evaluation of probability based on historical data which 
is covered in part 5.3. Here, we made an assumption that the users (expert team) evaluate 
the probability of attacks and cost of the atomic actions. But, the rest of the nodes in the A-
ADTree obtains their values based on cost oriented, or probability oriented approaches 
which is introduced in chapter 6. 
7.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we tried to briefly explain the main requirements, usecases, architecture, and 
limitation the of the implemented A-ADTree. The developed tool was based on an open 
source tool provided in [25]. Also, the functional requirements, and the behavior of the A-
ADTool are explained well in the appendix  with usecase diagrams.  
Database 
Graphical User Interface 
Computational Component  
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8 Examples of Usage of Aligned ADTree 
This chapter answer to the 
Q3.2. What are the examples of risk mitigation using aligned Attack-Defense tree? 
In [44] the authors provide two examples about evaluating the risk severity using the capa-
bility of a threat agent. They showed that the higher capabilities the threat agent has, the 
higher probability exist for the risk to happen. In this chapter, we are going to illustrate the 
same examples using A-ADTree, and then we show how countermeasures can mitigate the 
risks.Before we continue to the next step, we need to define the equivalent terminology in 
[44] and the concepts in A-ADTree. Table 35. shows how terms are equivalent. 
Table 35-Equivalent term in [44] and this thesis 
 Concept in [44] Concept in Aligned ADTree 
1 Capability Atomic Attack  
2 Score Cost of action 
3 Capability Likelihood Probability of success in attack method 
4 Risk Severity Sum of cost of treatment 
8.1  Risks on Video Conference System 
Video conference (VC) communication is a common tool in the daily business meeting and 
online lectures. The VC provide all the users in the same session the ability to read, write, 
and execute the shared documents. Also, users in a VC session can delegate each other to 
remotely control each other device, and camera. 
A malicious threat agent may intercept the channel between the users and eavesdrop over 
the channel. In this case, he is able to read or write some shared documents. The below table 
shows the likelihood, and score, for each capability of threat agent [44]. 
The examples in [44] only provide risks and attack methods, but here we add some counter-
measures to each of the risks or the attack methods. The crypto-functionalities can be used 
to protect the integrity and the confidentiality of the message. Also, with replacing the media 
with a new media which is not intercepted able can prevent man in the middle attacks. Table 
36. explains the likelihood, and score of each attack method in [44].   
Table 36. Correlation between score and likelihood in [44] 
ID Capability Score Likelihood 
C1 Discover an active station in VC 4 0.8 
C2 Eavesdrop the communications in the channel 4 0.8 
C3 Modify sent messages  3 0.5 
C4 Change installed software using an installed malware 2 0.2 
C5 Access to power in or off of the station 2 0.2 
C6 Modify the hardware using physical access  1 0.01 
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Table 37. Countermeasures against the attack methods 
ID Countermeasure  Cost  Of implementation Probability of  failure 
Counter1 Authenticate all join requests 2000 0.02 
Counter2 
Replace channel with a new 
un-interceptable one  50000 0.03 
Counter3 
Use crypto functionality in 
sent messages 1000 0.05 
Counter4 
Use anti-spyware system on 
the VC stations 5000 0.01 
Counter5 
Authenticate people before 
physical access 20000 0.01 
Based on the above capabilities of the threat agent, table 38 describes following threats. 
Also, table 37 include the countermeasure which may apply on the attack methods.  
Table 38. Correlation between threat, and capabilities [44] 
Threat ID Threat Description Risk Severity Capabilities 
T1 Join a meeting without authentication 11 C1, or C4, or C6 
T2 
Control the hardware like camera without au-
thentication 13 C3,or C4,or C6 
T3 Intercept messages in channel 11 C2,C4 
T4 Intercept messages in channel, and modify them 11 C3,C4,C6 
T5 Interrupt the VC station using DDOS attack 6 
C3,or C4,or 
C5,or C6 
T6 
Update firmware likes (ROM) without authenti-
cation 10 C4, or C6 
8.1.1 Structure of Attack Tree for VC Risk 
Here we use the data in [44] to make a tree in aligned ADTree. Figure 15 shows the skeleton 
of all risks in a video conference station, the risk can happen based on each of threats like 
T1, T2, or T3. The refinement of each threat node is based on table 36. We configure the 
atomic node, C1, as figure 16 shows. Then the properties of the root node in the figure 18. 
We can find the effect of threat agent profile, using the right-hand side border. In the very 
first step, we have chosen the “maximum probability” as a metric for choosing the child in 
the parent with disjunctive refinements. 
In VC examples, the T1, and T2 nodes have the maximum probability, therefore, they prop-
agates their probability to the parent which is the root node. 
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Fig 15. Structure of attack tree in VC example 
 
Fig 16. Configuration of atomic nodes 
 
 
Fig 17. Selection criteria in nodes with disjunctive refinement 
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Fig 18. Evaluation of risk regardless of threat agent profile 
8.1.2 Effect of Threat Agent Profile on Risk 
A threat agent with the profile like motive: personal fame, capabilities: undergraduate, 
opportunities: finite, and means: computer means, process, people, and intangible, obtains 
a score close to 0.25.We apply the threat agent profile on the risk evaluation. The result 
shows a significant risk reduction from 8.8 to 2.06. Such result is because the threat agent 
evaluation is about 0.25 of maximum. Figure 19 shows the properties of attack node after 
applying the threat agent profile on it. 
 
Fig 19. Evaluation of risk in presence of threat agent profile 
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8.1.3 Effect of Countermeasure Trees 
Then we can apply the countermeasures to see the effect of countermeasures on the risk. 
The labels on countermeasures are based on Table 36. Figure 20 shows the structure of A-
ADTree after applying the countermeasures. It shows the risk reduces from 8.8 to 2.64 after 
applying the countermeasures. 
 
Fig 20. Structure of A-ADTree in VC example 
 
Fig 21. The effect of countermeasure on properties of root 
8.2 Connected Vehicles 
A connected vehicle contains some sensors. These sensors help the driver to control some 
operations in driving. Also, the connected vehicle may connect with personal devices, and 
receive the orders from the laptop, or cellphone.  
Clearly, a threat agent can physically, or remotely find access to the sensors and manipulate 
the operations on the vehicle. For instance, the threat agent may affect the braking system 
with updating the Engine Control Unit (ECU). Such disruption leads to an accident  ,when 
the vehicle is moving.   Table 39 shows, the atomic actions of a threat agent in [44]. Also, 
table 40 shows how different capabilities of threat agent leads to a risk, based on [44]. Ad-
ditionally, table 41 shows the countermeasures of the vehicle. 
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Fig 21.Adding countermeasures to atomic actions 
Table 39. Atomic actions for threat agent 
ID Capability Score Likelihood 
C1 Threat Agent has physical access to ECU  3 0.5 
C2 Threat Agent can remotely inject message to CAN bus 2 0.2 
Table 40- Correlation between threat, and capabilities [44] for connected vehicle 
Threat ID Threat Description Risk Severity Capabilities 
T1 Remotely update ECU  12 C2 
T2 Disruption of the braking system of the vehicle 10 C1, or C2 
Table 41. Countermeasure solutions for connected vehicle 
ID Countermeasure  Cost  Of implementation Probability of  failure 
Counter1 Authenticate all join requests 4000 0.02 
Counter2 
Replace channel with a new 
un-intercept able one  30000 0.03 
8.2.1 Structure of Attack Tree for Connected Vehicle 
The below image shows how threat agent can use his atomic actions in table 37 to material-
ize the risks in table 38. For instance, to manipulate the braking system, the threat agent may 
modify the ECU physically or apply a man in the middle attack method on the vehicle. 
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Fig 23. Structure of attack tree in connected vehicle example 
Figure 24 shows the evaluation of the risk regardless of threat agent profile, and possible 
countermeasures. 
 
Fig 24. Evaluation of risk over the connected vehicle case regardless of threat agent 
8.2.2 Effect of Threat Agent Profile on Risks 
We apply the same profile in the previous example to this one too. Therefore, the threat 
agent with the profile like {motive: personal fame, capabilities: undergraduate, 
opportunities: finite, and means: computer means, process, people, and intangible} , obtains 
a score close to 0.25. The result shows that the profile of threat agent reduces the risk. 
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Fig 25. Evaluation of risk in presence of threat agent profile 
8.2.3 Effect of Countermeasure Tree 
We can apply the stated countermeasures to each nodes of attack tree in order to mitigate 
the risks. 
 
Fig 26. The countermeasures are applied on attack tree. 
Figure 27 shows the effect of countermeasure trees to the evaluation of the risk. It shows 
that, the risk is reduced from 0.6 to 0.36 after applying the countermeasures. 
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Fig 27. Risk evaluation after adding the countermeasures 
8.3   Summary 
In [44] the authors tried to measure the risk based on the threat agent profile. A threat agent 
profile in [44] includes the means, opportunities, and capabilities. Since, the threat agent 
profile in this thesis, and [44] has different parameters, the measurement of the threat agent 
is different. In this chapter, we used the examples in the [44] to show how the aligned AD-
Tree works. In [44] the author shows the effect of threat agent on risk evaluation. Based on 
it, the risk is higher when the threat agent has advanced skills. Here, we also obtained the 
same results with same data. We showed, although the evaluation of threat agent differs, 
lack of skills of threat agent reduces the final value of risk. 
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9. Conclusion  
In this thesis includes three main parts. The first part contains literature review about Infor-
mation System Security Risk Management (ISSRM)[1,2,44], and some of the common 
modeling languages such as Secure BPMN [4,5,7], Secure TOROPOS [9,10], Misuse case 
[13], and Mal-Activity diagrams [18], and their alignment to ISSRM. Additionally, we have 
reviewed the family of Attack Trees, specifically, the Attack-Defense Tree which covers 
two main concepts of ISSRM by its nature. Also, we have reviewed, some of the common 
measurement approaches of risk using attack trees. 
The second part belongs to the contributions. We first tried to obtain an alignment from 
Attack-Defense Tree to ISSRM. We called the obtained tree Aligned Attack-Defense Tree 
(A-ADTree). The ADTree covers risk concepts, and risk treatment partially, but some of the 
element are missed. The alignment helped us to detect the missed concepts of ISSRM in 
ADTree. Then we have added the missed elements into the ADTree, and obtained the A-
ADTree. Some concepts such as asset, vulnerability, and threat agent are added to ADTree. 
We used the added concepts to measure the risk concept. The risk measurement includes 
measuring the probability (likelihood), and cost of the risk. We have involved the asset, and 
vulnerability into the measuring the probability. Also, we can obtain the probability consid-
ering the profile of threat agent who performed the attack method. At the end we have in-
troduced how the values propagates in a bottom-up approach in A-ADTree. 
In the last part, we introduced the tool that we have implemented to show how the A-AD-
Tree works. This tool is based on the implementation of ADTree in the [25]. We have in-
troduced the functional requirements, and the usecase of the A-ADTool. In the last chapter, 
we tried to use the data, and examples in [44]. In [44] the authors showed that the profie of 
the threat agent affects the risk.We obtained the same results in [44] using A-ADTree.   
9.1 Assumption to requirements 
In this thesis, we have assumed that the atomic nodes are independent. Therefore, the cost 
of the atomic nodes do not cover each other. Additionally, they do not effect the probability 
of each other. These kind of assumptions, facilitate the bottom-up approach of measuring 
the risk, but usually in the real world the used attacks are not independent from each other.  
Also, in the implementation of the A-ADTree, we have assumed the probability of the 
atomic nodes are already given. Therefore, we did not involved in the evaluation of proba-
bility using the OCTAVE [37] method and historical data as it is proposed in the second 
part.    
9.2 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have proposed an improved Attack-Defense Tree which can show the dif-
ferent concepts of ISSRM. Additionally, this model is able to measure the risk based on its 
elements (attack method, asset, vulnerability, and countermeasure). Also, the implemented 
tool is able to show the effect of threat agent on the measurement of the risk. We showed 
that, if the threat agent has the advanced profile, the probability of the risk will increase. 
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9.3 Answer to Research Questions 
Here we briefly answer to the research questions. 
Q1. How can we show the main elements of risks in information systems? 
We have aligned Attack-Defense Tree to ISSRM, and detected that asset, vulnerability, and 
threat agents are not covered by ADTree. We added these three concepts to the attack nodes. 
As a result, the attack node show the attack method, and risk concepts. On the other hand, 
the countermeasure node covers the risk treatment concepts of ISSRM. 
Q2.How can we align Attack-Defense tree to ISSRM? 
Since, we have added the vulnerability, asset, and threat agent to the attack node, we can 
evaluate the probability of the risk based on these data. We used the OCTAVE to subjec-
tively evaluate the probability of attack node, but later we used the historical data, and Bayes 
theorem to calculate the probability quantitatively.  
Q3. How can we validate the aligned Attack-Defense tree? 
We have extended the code on the [25], to add a database which gets its data from historical 
data. Also, we have added some features to show that every node has a cost and probability. 
The cost and probabilities make the properties of each node. The implemented A-ADTree 
is capable to show the effect of threat agent and countermeasure nodes on properties of 
attack nodes. 
In [44], the authors provide two examples, and showed the effect of threat agents on the 
ISSRM. [44] showed that, the risk of an attack method has a direct relation with potentiality 
of threat agent. We used the same examples, and obtained the same results.   
9.4 Future Work 
In future, we obtain alignment from A-ADTree to the alignment languages, such as Secure 
BPMN, or Mal-Activity diagrams. These models also have been aligned to ISSRM. There-
fore, we can find what elements in different modeling languages have similar semantic 
meaning based on ISSRM. 
Additionally, it is important to automatically collect complete historical data. We may ob-
tain this data from log files of the information assets. In this part, we can obtain this data 
using machine learning technique.  
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Appendix 
I. Glossary 
II. Requirements of the Implemented Aligned Tool 
In this chapter we provide a complete picture over functional requirements and architecture 
of the tool which simulate the risk.  
 Textual Use case 
The implemented Aligned ADTree should be able to perform CRUD operations on the main 
concepts of ISSRM like asset, impact, vulnerability, and attack methods. Here we explain 
each of these requirements using Use-Case diagrams 
Table 43- Create an Asset 
Table 42-Edit Asset Usecase 
Use case Name Create an Asset 
Use Case ID 5 
Requirement ID 3 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Asset in Edit menu  
2-The user enters name, value, description of the asset, and number of 
attacks on the asset 
3-The user select a vulnerability 
4-The system registers the data into the database 
5-The system provides a message regarding to success or failure of in-
sertion into the asset table 
6-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Asset from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of insertion into asset table. 
Use case Name Edit an Asset 
Use Case ID 6 
Requirement ID 3 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Asset in Edit menu, and then 
chooses the Edit asset tab.  
2-The system loads all the asset data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an asset) in table 
4-The user clicks on update button 
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Table 44-Delete asset usecase 
5-The system opens a window which contains all current data of selected 
asset 
6-User can update the loaded data 
7-User clicks the update button 
8-System provides a message regarding success or failure of update 
8-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Asset from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in asset table. 
Exception Flow E1: No asset is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Asset in Edit menu, and then 
chooses the Edit asset tab.  
2-The system loads all the asset data into a table 
3-The user clicks on update button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select an asset. 
Use case Name Delete Asset 
Use Case ID 7 
Requirement ID 3 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Asset in Edit menu, and then 
chooses the Edit asset tab.  
2-The system loads all the asset data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an asset) in table 
4-The user clicks on delete button 
5-The system deletes the selected asset from Asset table in database 
6-The system updates the table view on opened window 
7-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Asset from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in asset table. 
Exception Flow E1: No asset is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Asset in Edit menu, and then 
chooses the Edit asset tab.  
2-The system loads all the asset data into a table 
3-The user clicks on update button 
60 
 
Table 45-Add vulnerability usecase 
Table 46-Edit vulnerability usecase 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select an asset. 
Use case Name Add a Vulnerability 
Use Case ID 10 
Requirement ID 2 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Vulnerability in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit Vulnerability tab.  
2-The system loads all the Vulnerability data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an Vulnerability) in table 
4-The user clicks on update button 
5-The system opens a window which contains all current data of selected 
Vulnerability 
6-User can update the loaded data 
7-User clicks the update button 
8-System provides a message regarding success or failure of update 
8-Usecase ends 
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refine-
ments nodes. Then the user chooses Vulnerability from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success 
or failure of insertion into vulnerability table. 
Use case Name Edit Vulnerability 
Use Case ID 11 
Requirement ID 2 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Vulnerability in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit Vulnerability tab.  
2-The system loads all the Vulnerability data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an Vulnerability) in table 
4-The user clicks on Update button 
5-The system deletes the selected asset from Vulnerability table in data-
base 
6-The system updates the table view on opened window 
7-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Vulnerability from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in asset table. 
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Table 47-Delete vulnerability usecase 
 
 
 
Exception Flow E1: No asset is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Vulnerability in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit asset tab.  
2-The system loads all the asset data into a table 
3-The user clicks on delete button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select a Vulnera-
bility first, and try again 
Use case Name Delete Vulnerability 
Use Case ID 12 
Requirement ID 3 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Vulnerability in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit Vulnerability tab.  
2-The system loads all the Vulnerability data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an Vulnerability) in table 
 
4-The user clicks on Delete button 
5-The system deletes the selected asset from Vulnerability table in data-
base 
6-The system updates the table view on opened window 
7-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Vulnerability from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in asset table. 
Exception Flow E1: No asset is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Vulnerability in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit asset tab.  
2-The system loads all the asset data into a table 
3-The user clicks on delete button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select a Vulnera-
bility first, and try again 
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Table 48-Create countermeasure usecase 
Use case Name Create Countermeasure 
Use Case ID 19 
Requirement ID 5 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Countermeasure in 
Edit menu  
2-The user enters name, description, cost of implementation, and failure 
probability of the countermeasure 
4-The system inserts the data into the database 
5-The system provides a message regarding to success or failure of in-
sertion into the countermeasure table 
6-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Atomic countermeasure from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of insertion into asset table. 
Table 49- update countermeasure usecase 
Use case Name Update Countermeasure 
Use Case ID 21 
Requirement ID 5 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Countermeasure in 
Edit menu, and then chooses the Edit Atomic Countermeasure tab.  
2-The system loads all the Countermeasure data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an Countermeasure) in table 
4-The user clicks on update button 
5-The system opens a window which contains all current data of selected 
Countermeasure 
6-User can update the loaded data 
7-User clicks the update button 
8-System provides a message regarding success or failure of update 
8-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Countermeasure from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in impact table. 
Exception Flow E1: No impact is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Countermeasure in 
Edit menu, and then chooses the Edit Atomic Countermeasure tab.  
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Table 50- Delete countermeasure usecase 
Table 51-Assign an Attack to a Countermeasure Node Countermeasure 
Table 52- Assign a Countermeasure Node to an Attack usecase 
2-The system loads all the Countermeasure data into a table 
3-The user clicks on update button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select an asset. 
Use case Name Delete Countermeasure 
Use Case ID 20 
Requirement ID 5 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Countermeasure in 
Edit menu, and then chooses the Edit Atomic countermeasure  
2-User clicks the delete button 
8-System deletes the countermeasure and updates the table 
9-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Atomic Countermeasure  from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, the table of countermeasures get updated 
Exception Flow E1: No impact is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Countermeasure in 
Edit menu, and then chooses the Edit Atomic  Countermeasure tab.  
2-The system loads all the countermeasures data into a table 
3-The user clicks on delete button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select an asset. 
Use case Name Assign an Attack to an Countermeasure Node 
Use Case ID 24 
Requirement ID 8 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the new ADTree from File menu 
2-The user right clicks on the root node 
4-User chooses the add child from pop up menu 
5-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses new ADTree from File menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, a child attack node is added to the root node 
Use case Name Assign a Countermeasure Node to an Attack  
Use Case ID 23 
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Table 53- Assign an atomic attack to each attack node in leaves usecase 
Table 54- Assign an atomic countermeasure to each countermeasure node in leaves usecase 
Requirement ID 8 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the new ADTree from File menu 
2-The user right clicks on the root node 
4-User chooses the add countermeasure from pop up menu 
5-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses new ADTree from File menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, a child countermeasure node is added to the root 
node 
Use case Name Assign an atomic attack to each attack node in leaves  
Use Case ID 25 
Requirement ID 7 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the new ADTree from File menu, 
user adds some children to the root 
2-The user right clicks on a leaf attack node 
4-User chooses the assign an atomic action  from pop up menu 
5-System opens a window which lists all the atomic attack actions 
6-User selects one atomic action 
7-User clicks “Ok” 
5-Usecase ends 
 
Pre-condition 
The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses new ADTree from File menu. User adds 
some children to the root attack node 
Post-condition When use case is done, when the window with the table of atomic actions 
are closed 
Use case Name Assign an atomic countermeasure to each countermeasure node in leaves  
Use Case ID 26 
Requirement ID 7 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the new ADTree from File menu, 
user adds a countermeasure to an attack node. Then add some children 
to the countermeasure node. 
2-The user right clicks on a leaf  countermeasure node 
4-User chooses the assign an atomic action  from pop up menu 
5-System opens a window which lists all the atomic  countermeasure 
actions 
6-User selects one atomic action 
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Table 55- See properties of each node usecase 
Table 56- Apply Threat Agent Profile on Properties of Attack Node usecase 
7-User clicks “Ok” 
5-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses new ADTree from File menu. User adds a 
countermeasure child to the root attack node. 
Post-condition When use case is done, when the window with the table of atomic actions 
are closed 
Use case Name See properties of each node  
Use Case ID 31 
Requirement ID 8,9 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the new ADTree from File menu, 
adds some nodes, and assigned atomic actions to all leaves. 
2-The user right clicks on node 
3-User chooses the properties  from pop up menu 
5-System computes costs of the node 
6-System computes probability of the node 
7-User selects one atomic action 
8-System open a window which shows the cost, probability of the node 
5-Usecase ends 
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses new ADTree from File menu. User adds a 
countermeasure child to the root attack node. 
Post-condition When use case is done, when the window with the table of atomic actions 
are closed 
Use case Name Apply Threat Agent Profile on Properties of Attack Node  
Use Case ID 35 
Requirement ID 11 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the new ADTree from File menu, 
adds some nodes, and assigned atomic actions to all leaves. 
2-The user right clicks on node 
3-User chooses the properties  from pop up menu 
5-System computes costs of the node 
6-System computes probability of the node 
7-User set up a profile for threat agent 
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Table 57- Choose the metric in disjunctive parents node usecase 
Table 58-Create impact usecase 
 
8-User clicks on the button  
8-System applies the threat agent profile on node 
5-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses new ADTree from File menu. User adds a 
countermeasure child to the root attack node. 
Post-condition When use case is done, when the window with the table of atomic actions 
are closed 
Use case Name Choose the metric in disjunctive parents node  
Use Case ID 36 
Requirement ID 13 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user runs the application 
2-The system asks to choose the metric  
3-User select one of the options 
7-User clicks on the “Ok” button  
5-Usecase ends 
Pre-condition The user runs the application 
Post-condition When use case is done, the main window of application is open 
Use case Name Create an Impact 
Use Case ID 1 
Requirement ID 1 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Impact in Edit menu  
2-The user enters name, and description of the impact 
3-The user select a level of impact 
3-The user select impact type 
4-The system inserts the data into the database 
5-The system provides a message regarding to success or failure of in-
sertion into the impact table 
6-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Impact from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of insertion into asset table. 
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Table 59-update impact usecase 
Table 60-Delete impact usecase 
Use case Name Update Impacts 
Use Case ID 2 
Requirement ID 1 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Impact in Edit menu, and then 
chooses the Edit Impact tab.  
2-The system loads all the impact data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an impact) in table 
4-The user clicks on update button 
5-The system opens a window which contains all current data of selected 
asset 
6-User can update the loaded data 
7-User clicks the update button 
8-System provides a message regarding success or failure of update 
8-Usecase ends 
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Impact from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in impact table. 
Exception Flow E1: No impact is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Impact in Edit menu, and then 
chooses the Edit Impact tab.  
2-The system loads all the impact data into a table 
3-The user clicks on update button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select an asset. 
Use case Name Delete Impact 
Use Case ID 3 
Requirement ID 1 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Impact in Edit menu, and then 
chooses the Edit Impact tab.  
2-The system loads all the asset data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an impact) in table 
4-The user clicks on delete button 
5-The system deletes the selected impact from impact table in database 
6-The system updates the table view on opened window 
7-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Impact from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in asset table. 
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Table 61-Delete attack usecase 
Table 62-Delete attack usecase 
Exception Flow E1: No impact is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Impact in Edit menu, and then 
chooses the Edit impact tab.  
2-The system loads all the asset data into a table 
3-The user clicks on delete button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select an impact. 
Use case Name Update Atomic Attack 
Use Case ID 17 
Requirement ID 4 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Attack in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit Atomic Attack tab.  
2-The system loads all the Atomic Attacks data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an Attack) in table 
4-The user clicks on update button 
5-The system opens a window which contains all current data of selected 
Attack 
6-User can update the loaded data 
7-User clicks the update button 
8-System provides a message regarding success or failure of update 
8-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Atomic Attacks from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in impact table. 
Exception Flow E1: No impact is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Attack in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit Atomic Attack tab.  
2-The system loads all the Attacks data into a table 
3-The user clicks on update button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select an asset. 
Use case Name Delete an Atomic Attack 
Use Case ID 16 
Requirement ID 4 
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Table- create atomic attack usecase 
 
 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Attack in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit Atomic Attack tab.  
2-The system loads all the Atomic Attacks data into a table 
3-The user select a row (an Attack) in table 
4-The user clicks on update button 
5-The system opens a window which contains all current data of selected 
Attack 
6-User can update the loaded data 
7-User clicks the update button 
8-System provides a message regarding success or failure of update 
9-Usecase ends 
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Atomic Attacks from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of updating record in impact table. 
Exception Flow E1: No impact is selected 
1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Attack in Edit menu, 
and then chooses the Edit Atomic Attack tab.  
2-The system loads all the Attacks data into a table 
3-The user clicks on update button 
4-The system opens a dialogbox, and asks the user to select an asset. 
Use case Name Create an Atomic Attack 
Use Case ID 15 
Requirement ID 4 
Brief Description 1-Use case starts when the user choose the Atomic Attacks in Edit menu  
2-The user enters name, description, cost of attack, probability of suc-
cess, and gain of attack 
4-The system inserts the data into the database 
5-The system provides a message regarding to success or failure of in-
sertion into the attack table 
6-Usecase ends  
Pre-condition The user has chosen the metric for evaluating of disjunctive refinements 
nodes. Then the user chooses Atomic Attacks from Edit menu 
Post-condition When use case is done, user will receive a message about success or fail-
ure of insertion into asset table. 
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Fig 28. Asset Use cases 
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Fig 29. Attack Use cases 
 
Fig 30. Decision in Disjunctive nodes 
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Fig 31. Countermeasure Use cases 
 
 
  
Fig 32. Decision in Disjunctive nodes 
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Fig 33. Node properties usecase
 
Fig 34. Apply threat agent profile on probability of attack 
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Fig 35. ADTree usecases
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Fig 36. Vulnerability usecases  
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